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The contemporary landscape of violence, if there is hope of breaking its hold on us, must be 
reconceptualized.  To that end, in his provocative undertaking States of Violence, Frédéric 
Gros provides us with a philosophical and historical analysis of the transformations in war 
which have led us to our current predicament—one that is defined by the new powers of 
security and intervention, as well as the perpetual image of suffering.  The broad reflections 
of philosophy, Gros writes, help to establish a starting point: they delineate for us, by ab-
stracting ethical principles from the inherent conflict of war, the transition from a time in 
which those principles were still viable to the present day in which they are being quickly 
destroyed.  Making his point boldly, Gros contends in his opening remarks that morality 
originates in ‚the clash of battles‛ and that it is a ‚universalization or spiritualization of the 
ethic of the warrior.‛ (4)  Such quotes immediately set the mood for much of what follows 
in States of Violence, a book equally as unsettling as it is hopeful in its unflinching genealogy 
of modern atrocities. 
Examining the historical shifts and nuances of the warrior ethic, which always 
pertain to the ethical structuring of the self in relation to death and violence, Gros begins 
with the myth of chivalry.  Whether discussing the knights of the Middle Ages or the heroes 
of the Iliad, a code of conduct and bravery are invented as the conditions of excellence.  The 
ethic of the noble fighter is in this way predicated upon courage, glory, loyalty, exemplary 
actions, aristocratic privilege, rivalry with a respected equal, and a sense of justice and 
honor.  Considered on its own, death is rather meaningless.  Embraced as a challenge or 
higher calling, it becomes the condition for a spectacular moment on the battlefield.  The 
ethical principle, in this case, gives form to fury by means of heroic distinction: ‚The 
warrior thus consents to live and to die in accordance with the form of a narrative, gaining 
the right to become a name, to have renown.‛ (11)  Because of a glorious accomplishment, 
the unity of the subject is crafted out of its own resilience.  The name of the warrior is 
remembered for having finished what he set out to do, for keeping an oath despite the 
obstacles and dangers.  This implies neither a Cartesian cogito nor a Kantian subject, but 
only a subject faithful to his promises: ‚The unity of the responsible subject is here the fruit 
of clear will and strength.  I am the same and the same I will remain—this is the promise of 





the warrior.‛ (18)  What this great deed often requires is a worthy adversary, someone who 
is of equal stature and nobility.  In this respect the mortal path of self-realization is bound 
up with a need for mutual recognition, without which the warrior’s boasts ring hollow: ‚It 
is necessary to find an adversary of one’s own quality and strength; otherwise, there will be 
only unworthy victories.‛ (21)  We therefore observe in this first construction of violence, 
one of five analyzed by Gros, an active relation to death shaped by the values of a specific 
moral sensibility. 
Drawing from the likes of Plutarch, Plato, and Aristotle, and momentarily turning 
away from his allusions to Jünger and Nietzsche, Gros engages with the sociohistorical 
phenomena supporting the Greek phalanx.  Replacing the Homeric duel, in which personal 
dignity and honor are of the utmost importance, the morality of the citizen-soldier em-
braces the interdependence of the entire formation.  This marks a shift in both the strategy 
as well as the underlying ethical position of that strategy: standing firm, rather than 
surpassing oneself in nobility and excellence, is the new development in moral phenomeno-
logy.  While quoting Seneca, Gros eloquently shows how the stoic perspective in battle 
transcends fear without resorting to mere impassivity.  Holding firm in one’s place does not 
equate with being detached or dispassionate, but underscores the virtues of courage and 
firmness in facing the blows of misfortune: ‚To endure does not mean to have no feelings—
it is to feel without allowing your feelings to distract you, and to stand firm.‛ (35)  Con-
trasted with the chivalrous warrior, whose unity of self was created out of an oath, the 
constancy of the hoplite is defined by his place in the phalanx, marching alongside his 
comrades in compact ranks.  He may very well be afraid, but he overcomes this fear for the 
sake of what is good and for the sake of the city.  To do this, he must first triumph over his 
own weaknesses: passions, desires, fears, impetuousness, and so forth.  Standing firm there-
fore implies self-mastery and self-respect, a deepening of one’s moral experience through 
patience and fortitude in the face of danger.  And ultimately this courage was strengthened 
by the solidarity of the group: standing firm is necessary when running from the enemy 
immediately leaves others in the phalanx exposed and unprotected.  Remaining at one’s 
post is crucial when the shields and spears of the troop create a unified wall of attacking 
and defending, and for this reason holding firm and remaining a master over oneself is at 
the same time a formidable social ethic: ‚What binds *this living solidarity+ together is 
concern for others and the urgency to protect them, an obsession with concern for others 
inasmuch as it proves to be more pressing than the imperative of preserving one’s own 
life.‛ (46) 
By the time of the Enlightenment, the ideals of heroism and philia give way to ra-
tional mechanization as the underlying principle of war.  The army is now thought of as a 
machine, and the soldiers are mere cogs to be ordered, situated, and deployed in the most 
efficient manner possible.  Through a close reading of military history, directly engaging 
the writings of François de la Noue, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the Marquis de Puy-
ségur, Gros observes that the new goal is to establish a total science of war. (54)  Geo-
graphy, architecture, physics, geometry, and arithmetic become the scientific models for 
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generals who are no longer leading charges at the front ranks of the battlefield, but instead 
giving orders and calculating positions.  Of course the State and military institutions be-
come all the more dependent on each other, especially as one takes into consideration the 
necessary resources involved in developing modern weaponry, artillery, and the overall 
massification of armies: ‚And the State will be able to arrange these resources only by 
imposing on its people a durable and consistent tax system, as it constitutes between itself 
and those it governs an obligatory, continuous, and general administrative relation through 
taxation.‛ (59) A centralized, hierarchical system is developed and refined in the admini-
strative control of inventories, logistics, headcounts, requisitions, discipline, training, in-
spections, and decision-making.  Modern warfare is therefore conducted by immense ar-
mies whose overall structures and movements are dominated by an administrative ap-
proach, by an all-encompassing logic which demands of its soldiers perfect discipline.  
What is required is nothing less than uniformity in action: the rationality of automatic and 
coordinated responses became paramount as technological innovation raised the stakes of 
calculative precision. (65)  Gros, known for his work on Foucault, elucidates the nuances of 
docility and consent which perforce complement the otherwise externalized administration 
of war.  Just as docility is distinguished from submission by its deeply ingrained obedience, 
consent departs from obligation in that the former presupposes a freely decided acceptance 
of exactly that which has already been determined for the rational, modern subject:  ‚the 
fact remains that in consenting, even for my greatest advantage, I consent to what has been 
decided for me by someone else.‛ (72)  These are the paradoxes of modern disciplinary 
structures, in which active consent is the pathological manifestation of blind zeal and con-
formity.  In this regard, modern power has become all the more effective and ubiquitous as 
it relays its commands, in the context of the military or the militarized State, through ad-
ministrative channels that already presuppose disciplined subjects, those good soldiers and 
citizens who freely agree to agree to everything. (75) 
 In the above accounts of war, from the chivalrous ethic to mechanized obedience, 
there is a moral narrative which opens itself up to the possibility of resistance.  Gros in fact 
develops this argument in the remaining configurations of violence, namely, sacrifice and 
total war, as well as the traditional categories of war thought in terms of justice, loyalty, and 
law.  The meaning of sacrifice, for instance, is all too often absorbed into a higher dialectical 
frame of patriotism, through which the individual’s death is transformed into a celebration 
of the eternal destiny of his people. (80-81)  But at the same time, Gros contends, the brutal 
experience of war opens the possibility of a reversal in sacrifice, so that it becomes detached 
from external values, concerns, and goals: ‚the experience of this total freedom rattles the 
strictly utilitarian dimension of sacrifice and opens out onto the general denunciation of any 
enlistment or requisition.‛ (93)  In this moment of freedom, it would appear, sacrifice is af-
firmed on its own terms, as opposed to being subordinated to an overarching nationalistic 
mythos.  In total war, entire populations are mobilized against one another in a spiral of ca-
tastrophic destruction.  These massive upheavals are motivated by a technological impe-
rative, in which all resources, living or non-living, are placed into the all-consuming and all-





destroying service of complete extermination. (116)  Total war is fundamentally, for Gros, 
technological: ‚As there is mass consumption, so total war is mass destruction, in which 
people are no longer anything but ‘human resources’ in the furnace of a machine that wants 
only to turn.‛ (117)  But even in this ideological hell, in which all reality necessarily reflects 
the delirious mobilization of totalitarian ideals, there is the motive to bring it to an end.  
Hatred seeks out the absolute annihilation of the enemy, and does this in order to emerge 
from itself all the more quickly and decisively. (120)  Contemporary states of violence, by 
contrast, seem to do away with even this mode of wishful moralizing. 
Before states of violence, war was concentrated both geographically and temporally: 
its battles took place in open plains and wide spaces typically set apart from the daily 
course of mundane activities, and they were fought during specific times according to 
which ‚*p+eriods of peace alternated with periods of war, in a relatively exclusive way.‛ 
(263)  Today we see modes of decentralized violence break out in unpredictable ways, from 
bombs detonated on a double-decker bus during London’s morning rush hour in 2005 to 
the terrorist siege of Mumbai’s Taj Mahal Palace & Tower in 2008.  Equally as disturbing is 
the phenomenological distance achieved by pushing the technological imperative to its 
extreme limit, so that violence becomes increasingly unilateral: ‚one can bring about the 
death of hundreds of thousands of enemies from the comfort of an armchair in front of a 
computer screen, and without risking a single moment of one’s own existence.‛ (268)  Tra-
ditional war was fought by enemies locked in an exchange of death which held out the 
possibility of a moral victory, whereas the contemporary state of violence is perpetuated by 
the myth of perfect security, which simply forms the counterpart to privatized and de-
regulated terrorist attacks.  What we are left with is an ongoing awareness of multiplying 
threats which must be monitored and neutralized, so that in our mission to respond to 
every imaginable danger, we exacerbate the conditions from which those threats arise.  The 
living individual thus becomes all the more vulnerable the more she is protected by systems 
of security, systems vigorously excluding the destitute who thereupon become feared as 
outsiders and used to justify heightened security. (284)  For Gros, it is precisely this bleak 
circle of anxiety, rage, and nihilistic destruction which cries out for us to ‚inspire vigilance 
and invent fresh hopes.‛ (290) 
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